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Despite decades of research, some of the most basic issues concerning the extraordinarily
complex brains and behavior of birds and mammals, such as the factors responsible for
the diversity of brain size and composition, are still unclear. This is partly due to a number
of conceptual and methodological issues. Determining species and group differences
in brain composition requires accounting for the presence of taxon-cerebrotypes and
the use of precise statistical methods. The role of allometry in determining brain
variables should be revised. In particular, bird and mammalian brains appear to have
evolved in response to a variety of selective pressures influencing both brain size and
composition. “Brain” and “cognition” are indeed meta-variables, made up of the variables
that are ecologically relevant and evolutionarily selected. External indicators of species
differences in cognition and behavior are limited by the complexity of these differences.
Indeed, behavioral differences between species and individuals are caused by cognitive
and affective components. Although intra-species variability forms the basis of species
evolution, some of the mechanisms underlying individual differences in brain and behavior
appear to differ from those between species. While many issues have persisted over the
years because of a lack of appropriate data or methods to test them; several fallacies,
particularly those related to the human brain, reflect scientists’ preconceptions. The
theoretical framework on the evolution of brain, cognition, and behavior in birds and
mammals should be reconsidered with these biases in mind.
Keywords: allometry, behavior, brain evolution, cerebrotypes, cognition, general intelligence, mentality,
personality
INTRODUCTION
Despite decades of research, some of the most basic issues related
to the evolution of brain, cognition, and behavior are still unclear.
In particular, in birds and mammals, in which most research has
been conducted, there are no satisfactory answers to the following
questions: Which factors control species differences in brain size
and composition and what is, if any, the role of body size? How
do brain size and composition influence species behavior? What
is the nature of species differences in cognition and behavior? As
a matter of fact, the increasing number of hypotheses being pro-
posed on evolutionary neuroscience and comparative cognition is
at odds with the paucity of theoretical background. For example,
there is a widespread belief that “although absolute brain size may
partially explain species differences in intelligence, the fact that
elephant and whale brains are several times larger than human
brains gives us pause and suggests the need to control for body
size” (Rilling, 2006). Yet, is it possible to compare species’ brains
irrespective of their taxa? Is it justified to consider body size as
the main factor controlling brain size? Finally, should the human
brain be taken as the reference brain when considering cognitive
abilities? As discussed in this paper, the answers to these questions
are negative.
More generally, there is a need for reconsidering some of
the methodological and conceptual bases of comparative neu-
roscience. Examining the literature on birds and mammals, the
present paper exposes definitive reasons for abandoning whole-
class analyses in comparative studies and highlights the impor-
tance of a detailed taxon-cerebrotype approach in brain evolution
studies. Possible factors underlying the changes in brain size and
composition inside a taxon-cerebrotype are presented, as well as
potential factors associated with variation in relative brain size.
These results are then summarized in a methodological section
on measuring cognitive abilities between species and in a sec-
tion about species variations in cognition and behavior. The final
section discusses the significance of intra-species scaling in the
evolution of brain and behavior.
COMPARATIVE BRAIN STUDIES IN BIRDS AND MAMMALS
In a sample of species ranging from bacteria and viruses to whales
and sequoia, there is a fairly strong relationship between species
size and generation time or population density (Harvey and Pagel,
1991, 3–4). Yet, because reproduction mechanisms as well as the
mechanisms underlying population density differ between the
taxonomic groups included in the sample, comparative analyses
on the factors underlying such relationships are inappropri-
ate at this phylogenetic level. This difficulty has generally been
overlooked in evolutionary neuroscience, leading to some mis-
leading concepts to be accepted and continuously reported. The
encephalization quotient (EQ) approach developed by Jerison
(1973) is an example of this concern. Basically, because brain
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size appears to increase regularly with body size by a power law
in mammals, Jerison has suggested the possibility of calculating
the expected brain mass of any species from its body mass and
relating it to the processing capacity by the mean of the EQ (a
measure of observed brain size relative to the expected brain size
predicted by the brain/body power law). As betrayed by its fre-
quency in literature, the very principle of the EQmethod has been
widely accepted. Yet, two major flaws, independently fatal for the
EQ approach, are presented below (see also Herculano-Houzel,
2011a).
BRAIN/BODY SCALING DIFFERENCES
The minimal assumption for the EQ method to be valid is a
universal exponent describing the relationship between brain
and body size among mammals. Yet, such an exponent is the-
oretically implausible and not supported by empirical results
(Worthy and Hickie, 1986; Harvey and Krebs, 1990). Thus, there
is no “expected brain size” for any mammalian species because
brain/body allometry is specific to each taxon. Besides, this sug-
gests that the extensive debate on the value and significance
of a hypothetical mammalian exponent [see review by Harvey
and Krebs (1990)] is groundless. Such taxa-specific brain/body
allometries, also present in birds (Mlikovsky, 1989; Nealen and
Ricklefs, 2001), are widely acknowledged, but their effects largely
underestimated (see also Deacon, 1990a). Yet, this causes a sys-
tematic bias in comparative analyses, visible for example when
regressing brain and body size from simian and insectivore species
[Figure 1, data from Stephan et al. (1981)]. All statistical anal-
yses in this paper have been performed using R software (R
Development Core Team, 2011).
TAXON-CEREBROTYPES
Studies using the EQ assume that brain size is an estimate of pro-
cessing capacity (Jerison, 1985). Such a hypothesis would require
that mammalian brains are size variations of the same model; an
issue tackled by the debate on whether the evolution of mam-
malian brain structures has been limited by some developmental
constraints (“concerted evolution,” Finlay and Darlington, 1995;
Finlay et al., 2001), or whether the size of brain structures could
vary independently between species (“mosaic evolution”, Barton
and Harvey, 2000). In fact, it is possible to define groups of
brains that have evolved under a bauplan that differs from those
of other taxa at most anatomical levels (“taxon-cerebrotypes”
Willemet, 2012 after Clark et al., 2001). Such diversity, despite
the presence of developmental [review in Charvet and Striedter
(2011)] and functional (Kaas, 2000) constraints definitely under-
mines the notion of a “universal scaling law” (Jacobs, 2012)
in the evolution of the mammalian brain structures (Willemet,
FIGURE 1 | Scatter plot of brain weight onto bodyweight (log scale) in
insectivores (light gray) and simians (dark gray). Humans have been
excluded from the analysis due to their large encephalization quotient (Rilling,
2006; but seeHerculano-Houzeland Kaas, 2011). Thedotted lines represent the
respective brain/body allometric slopes for each taxon, and the black dashed
line represents the common allometric slope. Note that when using a common
slope; the largest brained simian species possess negative residuals, whereas
the smallest brained insectivore species possess positive residuals.
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2012). Consequently, “the fact that elephant and whale brains
are several times larger than human brains” (see Introduction)
is, by itself, uninformative on their respective cognitive abilities.
Iwaniuk and Hurd (2005) have shown that bird species could also
be grouped into taxon-cerebrotypes (following Clark et al., 2001).
Interestingly, Figure 2 suggests that, unlike mammalian taxa, the
brain composition of Psittaciformes species is not predicted by
their brain size. The range of brain size (13-folds between the
smallest and largest brain of the Psittaciformes dataset, com-
pared to 18,100 and 250-folds in Pteropodidae, simians (human
species excluded) and carnivores, respectively, data from Reep
et al. (2007), Stephan et al. (1981) and unpublished data from the
same research group) is maybe too small to make a tendency vis-
ible, or species variability in Psittaciformes is particularly large.
Should this observation be confirmed and generalized to other
bird-cerebrotypes, it would suggest that both the factors under-
lying brain evolution inside a taxon and the methods needed to
study them might differ between birds and mammals.
REMARKS
The EQ method has been used here because of its significant
influence on brain studies and its popularity outside the scien-
tific community. The problems highlighted above should affect
every analysis in which datasets exhibit taxa-specific relation-
ships between variables (for instance in the scaling of the basal
metabolic rate with body size, (White et al., 2009, or the dura-
tion of the gestation period, Martin et al., 2005). Studies on brain
composition at the bird or mammalian level will necessary pro-
duce inconsistent results [see for example Kaskan et al. (2005) and
Barton (2007) for opposite conclusions concerning the adapta-
tion of the visual system in mammals and primates, respectively].
Indeed, even traditional groups such as bats, cetaceans, or pri-
mates are potentially subject to these inter-taxa characteristics
(e.g., Willemet, 2012). Comparative methods such as phylo-
genetically independent contrasts (PIC, Felsenstein, 1985) are
ineffective in dealing with this issue. The solution comes from
the determination and analysis of taxon-cerebrotypes (Willemet,
2012).
COMPARING TAXON AND SPECIES CEREBROTYPES
TAXON-CEREBROTYPEDIFFERENCES
For morphological and sensorial reasons, the quantity of infor-
mation coming from and directed to the body should differ
between taxa. Also, for ecological reasons, the nature of the
information from the environment and the manner of analysing
it should differ between taxa (see section Factors Underlying
the Evolution of the Size and the Composition of Brains).
Accordingly, an analysis comparing the size of each structure rela-
tive to the other structures in carnivores and simians (Table 1 and
Figure 3, see also Figure 4) reveals significant differences between
these two taxon-cerebrotypes [simian data from Stephan et al.
(1981); carnivore data from Reep et al. (2007)]. Moreover, and
in addition to the fact that simian species possess a brain around
twice as large as carnivore species of similar body weight [data
from Kirk (2006) and Finarelli and Flynn (2009)], a carnivore
brain differs from a simian brain in many other characteris-
tics. For example, except for small species, simians have a bigger
frontal cortex than carnivores for a similar size of the rest of
FIGURE 2 | Three dimensions principal component analysis of the
proportional size of Psittaciformes brain structures [data from Iwaniuk
and Hurd (2005), the analysis includes the size of nidopallium, Wulst,
mesopallium, striatopallidal complex, remainder of the telencephalon,
optic tectum, cerebellum, diencephalon, and brainstem]. The diameter of
the discs indicates the relative size of the brains in the taxon, i.e., the species
with the biggest brain in the taxon possesses the largest disc, and the area
of the disc of all the other species is proportional to the volume of their brains
compared to the volume of the biggest brain in the taxon. The black figure at
the top left represents the same pattern at scale 1:1 between x and y axes.
Although absolute brain size (log) significantly correlates with position on PC1
(t = −2.754, df = 18, p-value = 0.01306, cor = −0.54), the relationship is
driven by a single species (Calyptorhynchus funereus). Removing it from the
analysis confirms the absence of correlation between brain size and the
position in the PCA plan suggested by the figure (t = −1.7705, df = 17,
p-value = 0.09456, cor = −0.39).
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Table 1 | Differences between carnivore and simian cerebrotypes (human species excluded).
Medulla Cerebellum Mesencephalon Diencephalon Striatum Septum Paleocortex Hippocampus Schizocortex Neocortex
Medulla *** *** *** *** *** . ** NS ***
Cerebellum (+) . *** *** *** * NS . ***
Mesencephalon (+) − *** *** *** NS . NS ***
Diencephalon (+) (+) (+) * *** *** * *** ***
Striatum (+) (+) (+) (+) ** *** ** *** ***
Septum (+) (+) (+) (+) (+) *** *** *** ***
Paleocortex + (−) + (−) (−) (−) ** NS **
Hippocampus (+) + + (−) (−) (−) (+) *** .
Schizocortex + − − (−) (−) (−) − (−) ***
Neocortex (+) (+) (+) (−) (−) (−) (+) + (+)
First, a regression of a structure Y (rows) onto another structure X (columns) is done for simian species (log scale). Second, carnivore residuals for the struc-
ture Y are calculated using the equation obtained previously for simians and the carnivore structure X. Third, differences between carnivore and simian residuals
are tested using a Mann–Whitney test (if there is no difference between the two groups, mean carnivore residuals = mean simian residuals = 0). The sym-
bols on the upper diagonal indicate the level of significance: *** < 0.001; ** < 0.01; * < 0.05; .< 0.1; NS > 0.1. On the lower diagonal, a plus sign indicates
that simians generally have more Y than carnivores for similar X size, while a minus sign indicates the opposite. Brackets around the signs indicate significance
and are redundant with the symbols on the upper diagonal. For further details, see Figures 3 and 4. Note: removing Pinniped species (see below) does not
affect the general conclusions. In all cases, this method is illustrative only, as larger datasets and finer analyses are required before definitive conclusions. The
simian species include: Alouatta seniculus, Aotus trivirgatus, Ateles geoffroyi, Callicebus moloch, Callimico goeldii, Callithrix jacchus, C. pygmaea, Cebus alb-
ifrons, Lophocebus albigena, Cercopithecus ascanius, C. mitis, Piliocolobus badius, Erythrocebus patas, Gorilla gorilla, Hylobates lar, Lagothrix lagotricha, Macaca
mulatta, Miopithecus talapoin, Nasalis larvatus, Pan troglodytes, Papio anubis, Pithecia monachus, Pygathrix nemaeus, Saguinus midas, S. oedipus, Saimiri sci-
ureus. The carnivore species include: Bassaricyon gabbii, Callorhinus ursinus, Canis latrans, Crocuta crocuta, Eumetopias jubatus, Mephitis mephitis, Mustela
nivalis, Nasua nasua, Panthera leo, P. pardus, Phoca vitulina, Procyon cancrivorus, Puma concolor, Taxidea taxus, Ursus maritimus, Vulpes vulpes, V. zerda, Zalophus
californianus.
the neocortex (Bush and Allman, 2004, the term “neocortex”
has been preferred here against “isocortex” following Butler and
Hodos, 2005). Also, carnivore and simian cerebrotypes differ in
the pattern of neocortex girification (Pillay and Manger, 2007)
and cortical layering (Hutsler et al., 2005). In fact, it is likely
that differences between these two taxon-cerebrotypes affect most
neuroanatomical levels. Distinguishing taxon-cerebrotypes and
species-cerebrotypes differences is fundamental in understanding
how brains control species differences in cognition and behav-
ior. In this regard, the nuclear arrangement of the avian pallium
offers an interesting evolutionary alternative to the mammalian
neocortex (Güntürkün, 2005, 2012). It is important, however,
not to systematically generalize observations from one taxon-
cerebrotype to others (Striedter, 2002).
METHODOLOGICAL ISSUES
There are several difficulties inherent in allometric analyses. First,
researchers must distinguish between characters (potentially)
shared by all mammalian species and taxa or species-specific evo-
lutionary specializations. A particularly compelling example of
this issue is the spindle like cells that were originally thought to
be unique to apes and humans (Nimchinsky et al., 1999), but that
have then been discovered in the large brained species of virtu-
ally all mammalian taxa (Butti et al., 2011). Second, researchers
must distinguish between the confounding effects of the rela-
tive and absolute size of the structures. For example, Reep et al.
(2007) hypothesized that “perhaps the reduction of the olfac-
tory system in primates and humans is the unfortunate but
tolerable result of selection to increase the size of the isocortex by
reassigning stem neurons from olfactory bulb and hippocampus
to the isocortex” (see also Yopak et al., 2010). But do primates
(or simians) possess relatively small limbic structures? It actu-
ally depends on relative to what (Figure 4, see also Smith and
Bhatnagar, 2004 and Heymann, 2006 for interesting discussions
on olfaction in primates). In fact, the apparent trade-off described
by Reep et al. (2007) is due to differences in the structure rela-
tive sizes. Although in simians, the enlargement of the neocortex
(and cerebellum) has largely outweighed the enlargement of other
structures, it does not constitute proof of a “push-pull relation-
ship”, since there is no evidence that the selection of the limbic
structures has been constrained by the selection of a large neo-
cortex. Therefore, understanding the differences between species
and taxon cerebrotype requires the use of precise methods, able
to examine the variations of single brain structures and systems,
at the species and group level.
FACTORS UNDERLYING THE EVOLUTION OF THE SIZE AND
THE COMPOSITION OF BRAINS
Although understanding the factors underlying species differ-
ences in brain size and composition is a key issue in evolu-
tionary neuroscience, our current understanding of it is limited.
Nowadays, the “passive growth” of Aboitiz (1996) is consid-
ered to be “the main determinant of brain size across species”
(Aboitiz, 2001). Under this view, the “brain increases in size
by virtue of genetic and developmental coupling with the rest
of the body”; a process that “does not necessarily imply higher
processing capacity” (Aboitiz, 2001). Striedter (2006) suggested
that “evolutionary changes in absolute brain size [. . . ] are an
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FIGURE 3 | Plots of some of the most obvious differences
between carnivores (light gray) and simians (dark gray, human
species excluded) cerebrotypes (log scale). On average (although
an average is inappropriate due to slope differences), for similar
medulla sizes, simians possess a neocortex and a diencephalon 2
times larger than carnivores (neocortex: Minimum 1.323, 1st Quartile
1.506, Median 2.007, Mean 2.047, 3rd Quartile 2.322, Maximum
3.509; diencephalon: Min. 1.362, 1st Qu. 1.611, Median 2.001,
Mean 1.981, 3rd Qu. 2.150, Max. 2.785). On average again, for
similar mesencephalon size, simians possess a diencephalon and a
striatum, respectively, 55 and 85 percent larger than carnivores
(diencephalon: Min. 0.9346, 1st Qu. 1.3890, Median 1.5660, Mean
1.5480, 3rd Qu. 1.7180, Max. 2.1880; striatum: Min. 0.7174, 1st
Qu. 1.5750, Median 1.8810, Mean 1.8500, 3rd Qu. 2.2310, Max.
2.6490). Slope differences between these two taxa, unobserved in
Willemet (2012), are clearly visible here.
‘automatic’ consequence of changing body size” (original quo-
tation marks) and that “increasing absolute brain size ‘auto-
matically’ changes the proportional size of the individual brain
regions” (Striedter, 2006, original quotation marks). Under this
view, the evolutionary significance of brain structure size in
terms of cognitive abilities would be at best indirect, as its
evolution would depend on factors others than those select-
ing for cognitive abilities. Indeed, Deacon (1990a) considered
that “brain size [. . . ] is at best a hypothetical correlate of some
poorly understood mental parameters (e.g., intelligence, mem-
ory), which themselves are only hypothetically correlated with
any ecological parameter and are highly canalized and inflexi-
ble in development.” More recently, referring to the large pro-
portion of the neocortex in big brained mammalian species,
Barton suggested that “whilst it might be tempting to speculate
on the hitherto unappreciated intelligence of these species, the
most parsimonious explanation is that they are just large ani-
mals” (Barton, 2012). Yet, instead of being strongly anchored
in an empirical and theoretical framework, such a view arose
from misconceptions on the significance of allometric relation-
ships. Firstly, the fact that two variables (here, brain and body
size) allometrically correlate does not imply that one variable
(body size) controls the other (brain size). Second, brain size
is no more than the cumulative size of the structures that
constitute it. Therefore, it is probably more correct to consider
that brain structure sizes control brain size, rather than the
reverse. In this section, and even though much more work is
needed to understand the factors influencing size variations of
each brain structure (thereby controlling both brain size and
composition), several factors playing a role in the selection of
brain structures (in particular the neocortex and cerebellum)
are presented.
SOMATIC FACTOR
Even though the correlation between brain and body size in
mammals and birds has long been recognized (e.g., Dubois,
www.frontiersin.org July 2013 | Volume 4 | Article 396 | 5
Willemet Reconsidering brain evolution
FIGURE 4 | Scaling of limbic structures onto medulla (log scale) in
carnivores (light gray) and simians (dark gray). To strengthen the point,
pinnipeds species are not included in this analysis (pinnipeds apparently have
smaller hippocampus, paleocortex, and amygdala than fissipeds of similar
medulla size, but similar septum and schizocortex size, unpublished analysis).
In no cases does simians as a group have smaller limbic structures than
predicted by the size of their medulla when compared to carnivores
(differences between the actual size of the structure and the expected size
predicted by carnivore allometry; hippocampus: Min. 0.6793, 1st Qu.0.9240,
Median 1.2180, Mean 1.2010, 3rd Qu. 1.3930, Max. 2.1860; paleocortex: Min.
0.7696, 1st Qu.0.8467, Median 0.9241, Mean 0.9918, 3rd Qu.1.1050, Max.
1.5790; schizocortex: Min. 0.6056; 1 st Qu.0.7367; Median 0.9523; Mean
0.9787; 3rd Qu. 1.0800; Max. 1.6810; septum: Min. 1.434, 1st Qu. 2.119,
Median 2.383, Mean 2.442, 3rd Qu. 2.646, Max. 3.830). See also Table 1.
1897), the reasons for this relationship have, as emphasized above,
always remained unclear. An obvious but important factor is
that the brain must fit into the skull (Striedter, 2005), so that
only large animals can support large brains. However, this fact
alone cannot explain why large animals often have large brains.
It has been hypothesized that “larger organisms, which gen-
erally have larger organs, need to have larger brains in order
to control and service the increasing somatic and vegetative
demands that are inevitable consequences of increases in body
size” (Hofman, 1989). In agreement with this hypothesis, spinal
cord size rises with body size in mammals (MacLarnon, 1996).
This “somatic factor” (Jerison, 1973) is the first reason for which
we can expect a concerted pattern of evolution inside taxon-
cerebrotypes. Consistent with this approach is the fact that brain
size scales more tightly with fat-free body weight than fat weight
(a poorly innervated tissue) in a dataset of 19 rodent species
(Schoenemann, 2004). This hypothesis seems valid for the struc-
tures primarily implied with somatic function, but not sufficient
for explaining the enlargement of the neocortex and cerebellum
in particular.
Stevens (2001) has shown that, in primates, the number of
neurons (and the size) of the primary visual cortex scales with
a positive allometry compared to the number of neurons of the
lateral geniculate nucleus because as eyes get bigger in species, the
linear resolution of distances in the visual world also increases,
and in order to maintain the same spatial resolution in the
neocortex, the number of cortical neurons must increase with
positive allometry compared to the neuron number in the lat-
eral geniculate nucleus (the visual center of the thalamus). Thus,
part of the coordinate increase between brain and body size could
be related to this kind of functional constraints (see also Collins
et al., 2013). A study of the allometric relationship at the cel-
lular scale of the primate’s brain and spinal cord indicates that
although brain mass increases linearly with cord mass, the num-
ber of neurons in the brain increases faster than the number of
neurons present in the spinal cord (exponent of 1.7, Burish et al.,
2010). While this result could be consistent with the functional
hypothesis presented above, some associative areas of the brain
exhibit a positive allometry compared to other areas in primates
(for example the prefrontal cortex, e.g., Smaers et al., 2011a).
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This suggests that other factors participate in the enlargement of
structures.
NON-SOMATIC FACTORS
Although it is clear that no researcher ever considered the brain
just as the body’s control center, most authors have adopted
methods that explicitly consider the somatic factor as the most
important function of the brain. For example, residual analy-
ses or multiple regressions are used to control for “body size
effects” (e.g., Iwaniuk et al., 2004), and most authors would agree
that “the strongest driver of brain size is body size” (Changizi,
2010). However, brains guide individuals inside their ecological
and social environment (Umwelt), body control being an impor-
tant, but non-exclusive, part of this duty. Therefore, any species’
brain possesses more processing capacity than those required to
process body functions. The idea of dividing the brain in one part
dedicated to cognition and another to body control is not new and
has been criticized on the basis that discrete anatomical division is
unlikely (Deacon, 1990a). In fact, both parts are probably linked
in many ways. As Barton (2012) phrased it: “the evolution of
large brains was associated with the elaboration of sensory-motor
mechanisms for the adaptive control of bodies in their environ-
ments.” It is nonetheless possible to distinguish between the two
in formulating the hypotheses on the factors underlying brain
evolution. Indeed, what are the non-somatic factors that could
have played a role in the evolution of brain size and composition?
Longevity
The variable “body size,” often represented by body weight, is only
an approximation of a size factor (not necessarily a good one,
Harvey and Krebs, 1990; Burish et al., 2010). This “size factor”
is actually much more than a simple morphological variable and
involves the allometric scaling of many other lifestyle variables.
Of particular interest here is the observation that big mammals
live longer than smaller mammals (Speakman, 2005). Logically,
absolute brain size correlates with longevity (Sacher, 1959, Table
2 of Allman et al., 1993). Merker (2004) proposed that the size of
the neocortex is an adaptation for the long term storage of con-
textual information needed throughout a species’ lifespan. This
hypothesis is close to that of Allman et al. (1993) with the major
difference that Merker’s account concerns the absolute size of the
brain (or more exactly, the neocortex) correlating with absolute
lifespan, and not their relative values. The original hypothesis of
Allman et al. (1993) can in fact be adapted without even modify-
ing the authors’ original words: “one of the important functions
of the brain is to store information about resources in the envi-
ronment so that the organism can survive occasional catastrophes
by switching to alternative resources. The longer the life-span of
the animal, the more likely it is to encounter severe crises during
its lifetime. Thus, it might be expected that species with longer
life-spans would have larger brains in order to sustain individ-
uals through the more severe crises likely to occur in a longer
life” (Allman et al., 1993). Under this view, the large neocortices
of big bodied mammals are an obligatory feature that permits
the long-term storage of their longer “personal history” (Merker,
2004). Interestingly, the neocortex enlargement is coupled with
the cerebellum enlargement (Barton, 2002, see also Sultan, 2002;
Herculano-Houzel, 2010; Smaers et al., 2011b). In fact, in addi-
tion to its role in motor control, the cerebellum plays a role
in many other cognitive functions (Ramnani, 2006), and it has
been suggested that these two structures operate together, under
a cerebro-cerebellar system (Leiner et al., 1991). Imamizu et al.
(2000) have found that, in humans, the cerebellum possesses an
internal model of new tools after learning. Given that a bigger
lifespan implies more situations of learning, the enlargement of
the cerebellum is compatible with the view that a fraction of
brain enlargement responds to the need for storing the quan-
tity of knowledge that goes along with longer lifespan. However,
the relevance of the storage hypothesis is likely to vary across
taxa. For example, it might be less relevant in bats (chiroptera),
who have both small brains and a relatively high longevity (e.g.,
Brunet-Rossinni and Austad, 2004).
Information processing capacity
Many hypotheses on the cognitive factors that play a role in
the evolution of the size and the composition of brains have
been proposed. These hypotheses are traditionally separated into
two categories; ecological [the spatiotemporal mapping hypoth-
esis, Clutton-Brock and Harvey (1980); the foraging hypothesis,
Milton (1981), Gibson (1986); the technical intelligence hypothe-
sis, Parker andGibson (1977), Byrne (1997)] and social (the social
intelligence hypothesis, Humphrey (1976), Byrne and Whiten
(1989), Dunbar (1998); the relationship intelligence hypothesis,
Emery et al. (2007) [but see Scheiber et al. (2008); the cultural
intelligence hypothesis, van Schaik et al. (2012)], although the
two are sometimes linked (Dunbar and Shultz, 2007). Sensory
motor factors have also probably played a role in the evolution
of cognitive capacities via, for example sensory control of skilled
movements (Whishaw, 2003; Sultan and Glickstein, 2007) or sen-
sory adaptations (Paulin, 1993; Barton, 1998, 2004). Indeed, as
stated by Barrett (2011) “An adaptive fit between an organism
and its environment can also be achieved through selection for
a capacity that allows animals to continually update their knowl-
edge of the world.” In addition, there are evidences that body
size could influence a species’ cognition and behavior (Dial et al.,
2008). Charvet and Finlay (2012) have suggested that the longer
developmental time needed to construct larger brains and the
extended learning period associated with it should be viewed
as a factor in brain evolution. Therefore, it is possible that the
factors reviewed above act differently on altricial and precocial
species.
Each ecological niche is characterized by a certain combina-
tion of these factors. The adaptative approach presented here
postulate that the respective importance of these factors should
be partly visible in evolution of the brain architecture. In fact,
there is direct evidence that increasing cognitive capacities have
been a driving factor in brain evolution among simians. First,
Bush and Allman (2004) have shown that the frontal cortex scales
with positive allometry relative to the rest of cortex in primates
while it does not in carnivores. Second, Balsters et al. (2010) have
measured the volumes of cerebellar lobules in structural MRI
scans for capuchinsCebus apella, chimpanzees Pan troglodytes and
humans and have found a tendency for the lobules related to pre-
frontal cortex to get relatively bigger into the simian’s cerebellum
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as the brain gets bigger. Although a definitive conclusion would
require an appropriate dataset, this impression is supported by
the macaque monkey Macaca mulatta measure that fits between
the ones of the capuchin and the chimpanzee, as predicted by its
intermediate brain size. Interestingly, there are direct pathways
between the neocortex and medulla that become increasingly
important with brain size in simians (Striedter, 2005). This sug-
gests that, in simians, selection for higher processing capacity is
also linked to a better cognitive control of the body inside the
environment (see also Wilson, 2002; Barton, 2012).
It is important to note, however, that developmental and func-
tional constraints could limit the extent to which brain regions
can be selected individually. The neocortex, in particular, is
divided in areas devoted to a particular set of information (see
Krubitzer and Seelke, 2012 for an overview of their evolution)
and there is a correlation between neocortex size and the num-
ber of neocortical areas across mammals (Changizi and Shimojo,
2005; Striedter, 2005) due to the constraints of maintaining neu-
ronal connection when neuron number increases (Ringo, 1991).
As neocortex gets bigger, higher order cortical areas emerge from
core fields (Rosa and Tweedale, 2005, see also Kirkcaldie and
Kitchener, 2007), leading to a better treatment of neural infor-
mation (Striedter, 2005, but see Kaas, 2000). It is possible that,
due to developmental and functional constraints, selection for
some functions supported by the neocortex has consequences on
the whole structure [but see Welker and Seidenstein (1959) for
a counterexample]. In addition, it is possible that, compared to
smaller ones, bigger structures are better able to integrate new
functions (via neural reuse for example, Anderson, 2010) without
a correlated increase in size.
Although much more work is needed to unravel the mecha-
nisms and factors responsible for the evolution of brain compo-
sition, the approach presented here strongly contrasts with the
traditional (allometric) approach presented above, in particular
by giving a direct adaptive value for the size of each brain region.
Moreover, this approach undermines the hypothesis that varia-
tions in brain structure sizes are solely the consequence of their
position on the prosomeric axes (Finlay et al., 2001) and will
ultimately permit understanding of the full complexity of the
developmental model (including the cerebellum “exception” of
the “late equals large” model). Other factors, cognitive or not,
are likely to be added on the list of factors influencing the evo-
lution of the size and the composition of brains. For example,
the hypothesis of “adaptive redundancy,” which postulates that
in larger brains “memories are written into multiple circuits to
protect against interference or injury” (Chittka and Niven, 2009)
can be extended to the whole range of cognitive process. It is
also possible that the robustness associated with larger brains is
physiological (in terms of blood flow, glucose reserve, etc.). Also,
under the view developed above, the evolution of brain structure
sizes in taxon-cerebrotypes is concerted mainly because species
are under similar selection pressures. Importantly, the concerted
pattern hides a host of species-specific adaptations in brain com-
position that further adapts each species to its own environment
(see Krebs et al., 1989; DeVoogd et al., 1993 for early references).
However, most studies on this issue should be re-evaluated in
regard of the points discussed here, in particular the importance
of examining both the absolute and relative size of a brain region
(see also section Brain Composition and Cognition). It follows
from above that the variable “brain size” should therefore be used
with caution; as it hides the real variables under selection, the
structures (see also Healy and Rowe, 2007).
RELATIVE BRAIN SIZE
The preceding section has shown that body size is only one among
many other variables influencing brain size. Therefore, although
encephalization is a multidimensional variable (dependent on
all the cognitive, environmental and lifestyle factors associated
with brain and body size), the EQ reduces it to a bidirectional
(brain/body) approach. The true meaning of such an approxima-
tion has yet to be defined; in particular in view of the interest
researchers have for it (e.g., Lefebvre, 2012 for a recent review in
primates). For example, which structures participate in the rela-
tive (compare to body size) variations in brain size? A relatively
enlarged brain is thought to represent “selection for enhanced
processing capacity” (“active growth” Aboitiz, 2001). If true, what
fraction(s) of the processing capacities have been favored, or
reduced (long-term storage, sensory motor, or association capa-
bilities) with encephalization? How do variations in structure size
correlate with lifestyle variables?
BRAIN COMPOSITION AND ENCEPHALIZATION
The approach presented above predicts that species with rela-
tively larger brains present specific modifications in the taxon-
cerebrotype allometry reflecting the structures having been
selected (see also Aboitiz, 1996). Early support for this hypothesis
is found in Barton (1998) who reported that relative neocor-
tex size correlates positively with the EQ. Crucially, the extent
to which a structure participates in brain size variation depends
on its relative and absolute size (see also Lefebvre et al., 2006).
For example, in a hypothetical species with a 100 g brain, selec-
tion for the functions supported by a structure doubled the
size of this structure from 5 to 10 g (changing its proportion
from 5 to 9.5%). This species, although with a structure two
folds bigger than the ancestral condition, still possesses a brain
of almost the same size, 105 g. Because brain size has been
almost unchanged, this adaptation is nearly invisible for anal-
yses using absolute brain size or encephalization residuals. On
the contrary, a 2-fold augmentation of a 50 g structure raises
brain size from 100 to 150 g, one and a half initial brain size,
whereas the structure’s relative proportion goes from 50 to 66%,
an augmentation of 1.3 only. Therefore, changes in the largest
structures are the most likely to be detected by encephaliza-
tion studies (and to cause changes in absolute brain size, see
section Factors Underlying the Evolution of the Size and the
Composition of Brains). To address this point, one can test
the correlation between deviations from structure size allometry
and encephalization residuals. The analysis, carried out in three
relatively homogenous taxon-cerebrotypes: carnivores, simians,
and the chiroptera’s family Pteropodidae (see Willemet, 2012),
suggests that the neocortex is not the only structure modified
during encephalization, although larger datasets and phylogenetic
methods are needed before definitive conclusions can be drawn
(Table 2, Figure 5).
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Table 2 | Results of regression of residuals of the size of one structure against the size of another structure onto encephalization residuals.
Simians Carnivores Pteropodidae
Equation R2 F-stat (DF) P-val Equation R2 F-stat (DF) P-val Equation R2 F-stat (DF) P-val
Medulla
Cerebellum
y = 0.24 x 0.068 1.75 (1.24) 0.1986 y = 0.17 x 0.054 0.91 (1.16) 0.3538 y = 0.06 x 0.004 0.19 (1.44) 0.6682
Medulla
Mesencephalon
y = 0.20 x 0.252 8.07 (1.24) 0.009 y = 0.01 x 0.001 0.01 (1.16) 0.9263 y = 0.17 x 0.038 1.74 (1.44) 0.1945
Medulla
Diencephalon
y = 0.32 x 0.314 10.97 (1.24) 0.0029 y = 0.30 x 0.352 8.7 (1.16) 0.0094 y = 0.42 x 0.26 15.48 (1.44) 3e-04
Medulla
Neocortex
y = 0.49 x 0.388 15.2 (1.24) 7e-04 y = 0.35 x 0.446 12.9 (1.16) 0.0024 y = 0.57 x 0.141 7.21 (1.44) 0.0102
Cerebellum
Mesencephalon
y = 0.05 x 0.014 0.33 (1.24) 0.5705 y = −0.09 x 0.008 0.13 (1.16) 0.7227 y = 0.12 x 0.013 0.58 (1.44) 0.4494
Cerebellum
Diencephalon
y = 0.13 x 0.063 1.61 (1.24) 0.2164 y = 0.18 x 0.063 1.08 (1.16) 0.3146 y = 0.36 x 0.13 6.59 (1.44) 0.0138
Cerebellum
Neocortex
y = 0.25 x 0.161 4.61 (1.24) 0.0421 y = 0.20 x 0.084 1.47 (1.16) 0.2426 y = 0.50 x 0.123 6.16 (1.44) 0.0169
Mesencephalon
Diencephalon
y = 0.06 x 0.031 0.77 (1.24) 0.3882 y = 0.30 x 0.175 3.39 (1.16) 0.084 y = 0.23 x 0.06 2.79 (1.44) 0.1022
Mesencephalon
Neocortex
y = 0.17 x 0.17 4.91 (1.24) 0.0364 y = 0.36 x 0.142 2.64 (1.16) 0.1239 y = 0.35 x 0.05 2.33 (1.44) 0.134
Diencephalon
Neocortex
y = 0.10 x 0.057 1.44 (1.24) 0.2418 y = −0.01 x 0.001 0.02 (1.16) 0.888 y = 0.09 x 0.012 0.53 (1.44) 0.4696
Significant regressions (P-values < 0.05) are indicated with cell fill in dark gray. Data for simians and Pteropodidae are from Stephan et al. (1981) and unpublished
data from the same research group. Carnivore data for brain structure sizes are from Reep et al. (2007), and data for brain and body size are from Gittleman
(1986) and Finarelli and Flynn (2009) [from Bininda-Emonds (2000) for pinniped data, female values]. The human species is not included because it is an outlier in
encephalization residuals. For further details, see Figure 5.
The significant relationships between brain composition and
relative brain size suggests that variations in relative brain size are
at least partly due to similar pressures between species (it is likely,
however, that the factors controlling variations in brain structures
differ between these taxa). This finding, if confirmed, is interest-
ing given that the method used here does not distinguish between
changes in relative brain size that are due to enlargement of the
brain and changes that are due to reduction of the body (but see
Montgomery et al., 2010 and Smaers et al., 2012a). In particular,
the correlations between structure deviations and encephalization
residuals in simians could provide insight into some species char-
acteristics, like the relatively large cerebellum of gorillas Gorilla
gorilla (Rilling and Insel, 1998; Semendeferi and Damasio, 2000;
Sherwood et al., 2004). Inversely, these results suggest that the
human cerebrotype is closer to the simian cerebrotype than pre-
dicted by its EQ (not shown here), despite some claim about it
having a relatively large neocortex (Rilling and Insel, 1999). This
suggests that there has been selection toward a relatively large
cerebellum inmodern humans, as also suggested by the reciprocal
evolution of the cerebellum and neocortex during human evolu-
tion (Weaver, 2005). These results further support the approach
presented in section Factors Underlying the Evolution of the Size
and the Composition of Brains and suggest that the interpretation
that relative brain size is a factor of brain evolution (e.g., Smaers
and Soligo, 2013) ought to be re-evaluated and considered to be
a consequence of brain evolution. How each structure reacts to
selection is difficult to interpret from this analysis because the
reference used to determine the variations is the relative size of
the brain itself. An alternative to the use of brain and body size,
and one possible way to evaluate the quantity of brain relative to
the somatic factor could be to use the spinal cord as a predic-
tor (see also Burish et al., 2010 and Herculano-Houzel, 2011a).
Deviations from structure size/spinal cord allometry could be
a better way to measure the selection process of brain struc-
tures than deviations from brain/body allometry because it would
allow the detections of changes in all brain structures, irrespec-
tive of their size. Unfortunately, published data on the spinal
cord is scarce (MacLarnon, 1996; Burish et al., 2010). Finally,
although Herculano-Houzel (2007) has suggested that neuron
number in brain structures is independent of the EQ in rodents,
larger datasets are needed to examine whether the selective pres-
sures linked to the EQ produce distinct changes in structure
composition.
COGNITIVE FACTORS
It follows from the above that the selective pressures responsible
for a brain’s relative size should in fact mainly target the func-
tions supported by the neocortex (and to a lesser extent, the
cerebellum) and therefore, affect species’ processing capacities.
It is unclear; however, which part(s) of the processing capacities
(cognitive, sensory-motor, information storage) is/are favored (or
reduced) by variations in encephalization.
The storage hypothesis is grounded on neocortical organiza-
tion (Merker, 2004), so that any increase in neocortex size should
lead to an increase in brain storage capacity, even without direct
selection for it. Indeed, relative brain size correlates with relative
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FIGURE 5 | Details from Table 2. Residuals from regressions of diencephalon (left) and neocortex (right) size onto the size of the medulla regressed onto
encephalization residuals.
lifespan in primates (Allman et al., 1993; Barrickman et al., 2008).
As the precise architecture of the cortico-cerebellar system and
the mechanisms underlying information storage are uncovered, it
will be possible to test this hypothesis more precisely.
Selection toward sensory-motor capacities could be one of
the factors underlying changes in relative brain size. As dis-
cussed in section Non-somatic Factors, larger neocortex size
could automatically lead to finer sensory motor representation,
again even without direct selection for it. For some species it
is also possible that larger brains have been selected specifically
for increasing sensory-motor capacities in one or several modal-
ities. For example, Barton (1998) showed a correlation between
relative brain size and the size of the parvocellular pathway of
the lateral geniculate nucleus (a visual center of the thalamus
involved in the analysis of fine detail and color) in primates (see
also Barton, 2004). Similarly, the relative amount of visual input
correlates with relative brain size in primates (Kirk, 2006, see
also Garamszegi et al., 2002). It is unclear, however, the extent
to which selection for superior sensory-motor abilities can lead
to increase in absolute (and therefore, relative) brain size. For
example, although the North American raccoon Procyon lotor has
a very large forepaw cortex that matches the extensive use of
its hands (Welker and Seidenstein, 1959), there is no evidence
that such a change can lead to a significant increase in brain
size.
The most studied factor of encephalization is the cogni-
tive buffer hypothesis, in which a relatively enlarged brain
“facilitates the construction of behavioral responses to unusual,
novel or complex socioecological challenges” (Sol, 2009). As for
the storage and sensory-motor hypotheses, the cognitive buffer
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hypothesis could partly be a necessary consequence of increased
neocortex size. Unfortunately, support for the cognitive buffer
hypothesis often comes from studies that have mixed several
taxa, and thus, several taxon-cerebrotypes [reviewed in Healy and
Rowe (2007)]. Furthermore, for reasons that follow the discus-
sion above, and detailed in the next section, the EQ cannot be
systematically linked with absolute measures of cognitive abili-
ties. If the encephalization process were associated with increased
cognitive capacities, then a positively encephalized brain should
have greater cognitive capacities than a similarly sized brain with
neutral encephalization. In primates, the Pearson correlation test
between residuals from the regression of an estimate of general
cognitive ability onto the size of the brain on one side, onto
encephalization residuals calls for further studies (t = 1.9854,
df = 21, p-value = 0.06032, cor = 0.4, psychological data from
Deaner et al., 2006). Notwithstanding the fact that the precision
of the data is critically small and that many factors other than
structure size control cognitive abilities (see sections Brain and
Cognition; Species Differences in Cognition and Behavior), one
of the reasons for this mixed result is the possibility that the
size constraint has selected for mechanisms that increase brain
efficiency in species with relatively small brains (Strasser and
Burkart, 2012). A related hypothesis is that species that have
undergone a decrease in brain size (see Montgomery et al., 2010)
have kept some of the anatomical or physiological mechanisms
evolved by their ancestor to counter the constraints of brain size
(this could be an important factor in understanding the tech-
nology of the small brained Homo floresiensis, see for example
Morwood et al., 2005). In all cases, searching for encephaliza-
tion correlates is probably rendered difficult because many factors
potentially influence brain structure sizes; to some extent in a
species-specific way.
CORRELATION BETWEEN BRAIN SIZE AND OTHER LIFESTYLE AND
ENVIRONMENTAL VARIABLES
While having a large brain is cognitively advantageous over a
smaller one, the evolution of brain size has not been a one-
way process (Niven, 2005; Safi et al., 2005; Montgomery et al.,
2010; Smaers et al., 2012a). Many hypotheses on this issue sug-
gest some kind of trade-off between brain (energetically expensive
Aiello and Wheeler, 1995) and physiological or lifestyle variables.
These hypotheses include metabolic constraints (e.g., Martin,
1981; Isler and van Schaik, 2006, but see Jones and MacLarnon,
2004), maternal investment (e.g., Martin, 1996; Finarelli, 2010;
Barton and Capellini, 2011), neonatal maturity (Weisbecker and
Goswami, 2011) and energy trade-off hypotheses [e.g., Aiello and
Wheeler, 1995 (but see Hladik et al., 1999); Navarrete et al., 2011].
How these factors could influence brain size is discussed in their
respective paper (see also section Methodological Issues).
However, the notion of “trade-off” to which these studies often
refer is particularly difficult to test in a multidimensional world,
as it entails more than a simple negative correlation between
two variables. For example, although Pitnick et al. (2006) have
found a correlation between relative brain size and mating sys-
tem, adding only one variable to the analysis (morphological
adaptation to foraging strategy) changes the allure of the results,
with no correlation between testes mass and relative brain size
(Dechmann and Safi, 2009, see also Lemaître et al., 2009). By
increasing (or decreasing) its quantity of brain, a species changes
the exploitation of its environment as well as the lifestyle vari-
ables that are associated with these changes. Therefore, although
the notion of ecological constraints on brain size is particularly
compelling (e.g., Winkler et al., 2004), the notion of “trade-
off” should be called only when sufficient evidence supports
it. Kotrschal et al. (2013) recently studied the possible trade-off
between brain and gut size and offspring number. Although these
results have been reported as “compelling experimental evidence
for the cost of increased brain size,” the “trade-off” discussed in
the expensive tissue hypothesis results from a limited amount
of resources for which brain and gut evolutionary “compete.”
In contrast, nutrients were abundant in Kotrschal et al. (2013)
experiment, so the notion of cost has still to be precisely defined
(see also Warren and Iglesias, 2012). Moreover, as discussed
below, results from intra-species studies cannot be systematically
transferred to the species level. The complex and interrelated rela-
tionships between all the cognitive, environmental and lifestyle
variables, and brain and body size and composition constitute a
global evolutionary strategy. This concept of strategy rectifies the
notion behind the trade-off approach that all species hypothet-
ically tend to have a bigger brain, but that only some can offer
one because of the costs that it entails. Furthermore, it removes
the apparent paradox that brain size could have cognitive impli-
cations while being determined by lifestyle constraints (Deacon,
1990a).
BRAIN AND COGNITION
BRAIN SIZE AND COGNITION
In primates, by far the most studied mammalian taxon, several
authors have recently suggested that absolute brain size could
best explain species differences in cognitive abilities (Gibson,
2002; Deaner et al., 2007; Lee, 2007; see also Dunbar, 1992, but
see Amici et al., 2010; Schmitt et al., 2012 and section From
Cognition to Behavior: The Role of “Mentality”). This result was
so counterintuitive that it is emphasized in the title of one of these
influential papers “Overall Brain Size, and Not Encephalization
Quotient, Best Predicts Cognitive Ability across Non-Human
Primates” (Deaner et al., 2007). However, despite this new gain of
interest toward absolute brain size (e.g.,Marino, 2006), a coherent
framework is still lacking.
As discussed in section Factors Underlying the Evolution of the
Size and the Composition of Brains, absolute brain size (through
the scaling of absolute features like the number of neurons and
cortical areas and the structures’ relative sizes) is linked to species
differences in processing capacity. Yet, the somatic factor hypoth-
esis suggests that the “amount” of processing capacity dedicated
to somatic factors also increases with body size. Therefore, for two
species of similar brain size, but of different body sizes, the cogni-
tive advantage should be for the smallest bodied species. However,
as illustrated in Figure 6, none of these two variables, absolute
brain size or EQ, can potentially take the other into account.
More generally, it would be interesting to have, inside a taxon-
cerebrotype, an approximation of the fraction of brain size that
responded to the extended somatic factor (that is, all the fac-
tors associated with body size) and the fraction dedicated to
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FIGURE 6 | Differences between encephalization quotient and absolute
size in estimating species cognitive capacities. (A) Representation of the
slopes. (B) Detail of the residuals (the scale is not respected between the 3
cases). At slope equals 1.05 (slope obtained by a regression of hypothetical
brain and body size), encephalization quotient is insensitive to brain size. At
slope between 0 and 1, encephalization quotient is sensitive both to absolute
and relative brain size. At slope equals 0, encephalization quotient equals
absolute brain size. Although the preceding section has shown that brain size
does not directly depend on body size, residuals have been computed using
linear regression, the most used method for computing encephalization
residuals (but see Warton et al., 2006 and O’Connor et al., 2007 for
discussions on the regression methods used in comparative biology).
cognitive function. One possible method is to observe the corre-
lation between encephalization residuals and a general measure of
cognitive ability when the value of the encephalization slope (and
therefore the effect of body size on brain size) varies. Figure 7
represents this analysis carried out in primates, the only taxon
(although significant differences between major primate impose
finer analyses, see Isler et al., 2008; Willemet, 2012) for which a
dataset vaguely corresponding to such a measure exists (Deaner
et al., 2006).
Figure 7 corroborate earlier findings that brain size better
predicts species cognitive ability than does EQ in primates and
suggests that the extended somatic factor have played only a lim-
ited role on the evolution of brain size in primates. This is in
accordance with the evidences presented in section Information
Processing Capacity, which suggest that selection for large cogni-
tive abilities played a major role in simian brain evolution. The
results of this analysis appear to be counterintuitive; however, as
body size appears to better predict cognitive capacities than brain
size itself [as in Deaner et al. (2007)]. A part of this result is prob-
ably due to species-specific adaptations. Moreover, Deaner et al.’s
(2006) data on species differences in cognitive abilities are neither
accurate nor comprehensive. With quality data, the allure of this
analysis in other taxa could be particularly interesting for under-
standing the relation between brain size (absolute and relative)
and cognition. Indeed, it is possible that, in other taxa, most of the
variation in brain size has resulted from selection to the extended
somatic factor and that only species that had selection for more
cognitive abilities have increased the size of the brain regions asso-
ciated with it. In these taxa, the EQ (or residuals from a slope close
to it) should better predict cognitive abilities than absolute brain
size (although even in that case, the processing capacity added
should differ between species, see Herculano-Houzel, 2007 for an
explanation based on neuron numbers).
At the cellular level, Herculano-Houzel (2007) has first pro-
posed that “the total number neurons in excess of the expected
from body size in each species” would be an indicator of species
cognitive abilities. However, such a method is subject to the
same flaws as the EQ method discussed above. Due to their pro-
portional scaling with the number of spinal cord neurons, the
number of neurons “expected from body size” has then been
approximated by the number of neurons in structures others
than neocortex and cerebellum (Rest of Brain, RoB, Herculano-
Houzel, 2011a). Because RoB neuron number is low compared
to total brain neurons, the author went on to suggest that, in
mammals, “the cognitive abilities of a species might be simply
a function of its total number of brain neurons” (Herculano-
Houzel, 2011a). However, neurons in the cortico-cerebellar sys-
tem in particular are not equally distributed among taxa (e.g.,
Bush and Allman, 2004) and areas (e.g., Cahalane et al., 2012) and
species differ in neuronal connectivity (DeFelipe et al., 2002), so
that two brains with a similar number of neurons should differ in
their processing capacity. Therefore, studies at the neuronal level
will need to be particularly detailed, in the number of species,
structures and cell types scanned, to reveal their whole potential.
In conclusion, the variables “brain” and “cognition” both rep-
resent a set of variables which are particularly complex (see also
section Species Differences in Cognition and Behavior), so that
any attempt to link these two “meta variables” will always be a
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FIGURE 7 | General intelligence scores and encephalization slope in
primates (brain and body data from Kirk, 2006, general intelligence scores
from Deaner et al., 2006). Residuals from regression of brain onto body
masses have beenobtainedby varying the encephalization slope value from−1
to 2 (step= 0.01). For every given slope, a linear regression between
intelligence scores ontobrain/body residuals has beencarried out. The resulting
r -squared is indicated by green dots when the regression is significant, and by
red dots when it is not. In addition, the dots are filled when residuals correlate
with brain size, and empty when not. The correlation between brain/body
residuals and intelligence score lessens when the slope value approaches the
value from a linear regression of brain onto body size (0.77). The r -squared from
a regression between brain/body residuals onto body and brain size are shown
by triangle and square lines, respectively; with filled symbols for significant
correlations. The horizontal dotted line represents the percentage of variance in
intelligence scores explained by absolute body (brown) and brain (blue) size.
Using a slope equals to 0.28 (Williams, 2002; Alba, 2010) is unwarranted.
rough approximation of the relationship between the variables
that constitute them. As stated by Barton (2012), “the search
for a single ideal comparative brain measure that captures the
neural basis of cognitive evolution is likely to be more obfusca-
tory than illuminating, because different selection pressures have
acted on different neural systems at different times.” Therefore,
far from being “fruitless” (Jerison, 1985), looking at finer corre-
lates of cognitive abilities is a fundamental issue in comparative
neuroscience.
BRAIN COMPOSITION AND COGNITION
As pointed out by Striedter (2005) through the example of the
small but crucial suprachiasmatic nucleus (that controls circa-
dian rhythms), the importance of a structure in the brain network
or in a species’ life are two different things. However, absolute
features of a brain structure, such as its size and the number
of neurons and synapses can theoretically have an impact on
the structure’s computational power (Striedter, 2005). For exam-
ple, the particularly sensitive and agile hands of raccoons are
linked with a particularly large cortical representation of the
forepaws (Welker and Seidenstein, 1959). Importantly, however,
whether a bigger structure generates higher processing capac-
ity is true only when the advantages of being larger compensate
for the functional constraints on conduction time and neu-
ronal connectivity for example. Therefore, the relation between
structure size and processing capacities is not necessarily linear
and should depend on the intimate composition of a struc-
ture determined by the taxon-cerebrotype characteristics (such
as the scaling of cell number in structures, Herculano-Houzel,
2011b). The relative size of brain structure also plays a role
in the structure’s importance inside the brain network. The
principle of “large equals well-connected” (Striedter, 2005 after
Deacon, 1990b) states that the larger a structure becomes in
evolution, the more its neurons invade the other regions, accent-
ing the region importance in the brain network. It is likely,
however, that evolutionary mechanisms (like favoring intra-
structure neuronal connection) limit this “invasion” when it is
not adaptive.
Because brain structures or regions rarely support only one
function, and because apparently similar behaviors can have
different underlying cognitive mechanisms, understanding how
brain composition influences cognitive abilities is complex. For
example, the mechanisms for food hoarding behavior (one of
the most studied behavioral traits) vary from simple retrieval
mechanisms (Brodin, 2005; Smulders et al., 2010) to probably
multi-dimensional maps in which the age and content of the
cache is remembered (Clayton and Dickinson, 1998). Moreover,
and in addition to the fact that studies often mix various taxa, a
number of methodological issues have been highlighted in pre-
vious papers (e.g., Bolhuis and Macphail, 2001; Healy and Rowe,
2007; Roth et al., 2010 see also next subpart). Furthermore, the
size of a structure is not the only parameter that accounts for its
function (Roth et al., 2010), forcing neuroecologists to examine
different levels of analysis (Ball et al., 2002; Pollen and Hofmann,
2008). By their correlative nature, comparative analyses are insuf-
ficient for studying the mechanisms underlying behaviors so that
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a back and forth paradigm between experimental and compara-
tive analyses is probably needed to study the neuronal correlates of
complex behaviors (Pollen and Hofmann, 2008; Smulders et al.,
2010) and to eventually draw a evolutionary framework on these
characters (MacLean et al., 2012).
METHODOLOGICAL ISSUES
In addition to the points raised above, three issues in particular
affect comparative studies on brain, cognition, and behavior.
(1) The strength of a hypothesis directly depends on the strength
of the data on which it is based. Yet, datasets are often too
small, making results difficult to interpret. Twenty years ago,
Jerison already complained about “how much longer we will
have only Stephan and his colleagues for appropriately large
samples of measures of the brain” (Jerison, 1993). Except
for the contribution of Reep et al. (2007) and some spo-
radic additions of new mammalian species, the number of
species for which brain composition is known has steadied, as
have intra-species measurements. This is problematic, since
the acuity of the determination of cerebrotype characteris-
tics directly depends on the number of species for which
data are available (see also Yopak, 2012). Indeed, while pri-
mates are the mammalian order for which there is the largest
amount of anatomical and lifestyle data (e.g., Dominy et al.,
2004; Striedter, 2005; Preuss, 2007; Barrickman et al., 2008;
Herculano-Houzel and Kaas, 2011), data on brain structure
is available for less than 25 percent of species (estimated
at around 200, Purvis, 1995). Similar conclusions apply to
birds, for which high quality data is only available for a
limited number of species (Boire and Baron, 1994; Iwaniuk
et al., 2004). Fortunately, imaging studies, beside ethical and
free from shrinkage problems, can now be used for getting
brain measurements (e.g., Semendeferi and Damasio, 2000;
Sherwood et al., 2004). After decades of testing, the most
complete data on comparative cognition in mammals con-
cerns the primate taxon (Deaner et al., 2006; Reader et al.,
2011). However, primate data is incomplete in the number
of tests done by each species, requiring complex statistics to
compensate for the lack of data (Johnson et al., 2002; Deaner
et al., 2006) while still being at the genus level. Data from
the wild (e.g., Reader et al., 2011 in primates) represents an
important source formapping species differences in cognitive
abilities (Kamil, 1987; Byrne and Bates, 2011). Indeed, ethi-
cal methods of data acquisition are developed to test wild or
semi-wild animals (e.g., Fagot and Paleressompoulle, 2009;
Woods and Hare, 2010; Marino and Frohoff, 2011; Gazes
et al., 2013; Healy and Hurly, 2013). Finally, although a few
model species in the laboratory have been extensively studied,
most of them have been raised for decades in artificially poor
environments that potentially affect normal brain function-
ing (Würbel, 2001 and see section Intra-specific Analyses).
Whether it is relative to brain composition or cognitive abil-
ities, increased collaborations, and data sharing are the keys
to improving this point (Tomasello and Call, 2011; MacLean
et al., 2012).
(2) Because they compare species with shared evolutionary his-
tory, comparative studies do not fill the condition necessary
for most statistical methods; the independence of data points
(Felsenstein, 1985). The use of sophisticated comparative
methods (MacLean et al., 2012) associated with high qual-
ity phylogenetic trees (e.g., Arnold et al., 2010) is a necessary
step to improve our understanding of the evolution of brain,
cognition, and behavior.
(3) Whether a correlation is significant or not is only a statis-
tical description of the data, and is insufficient to state that
two biological variables co-vary. In other words, p-values
and regression coefficients are not enough and two ques-
tions should systematically be asked in regression analyses.
The first is; can the regression predict the value of the vari-
able of interest in a biologically significant way? The second
is; can we explain the potential extreme values? Only when
these two criteria satisfied are the regression analyses strong
enough to serve as basis for other studies. In the other cases,
future studies should clarify the relationships between the
variables. Importantly, because of the uncertainty existing in
variable relationships and the often small datasets available,
results frommultiple regressions (or related methods) should
be interpreted particularly cautiously.
Unless proven otherwise, these issues, and those discussed above,
should necessarily have adverse consequences for each paper in
which they are found (including some papers reviewed here),
so that a number of published works will probably need to be
reanalysed as soon as better data is available. Consequently, read-
ers should keep the following biases in mind when referring to
previous papers or when designing future research.
SPECIES DIFFERENCES IN COGNITION AND BEHAVIOR
COGNITION
Deacon (1990a) remarked that “no one would consider rank-
ing such mammals as dolphins, rabbits, moles, horses, bats, and
gibbons according to some linear scale of locomotor efficiency,
capacity, or competence.” Similarly, such an observation could
be true for cognitive abilities. However, in the case of locomo-
tor efficiency, one can measure species speed or endurance for
instance, and this makes sense, for example, when considering
prey/predator interaction. Likewise in the case of cognition, one
can consider ways to approximate the ability to resolve prob-
lems or the ability to have a complex mental representation of
the world. Indeed, Andrews (2011), qualifies the current period
as “a kind of golden era when it comes to animal cognition
research.” Considering the number of papers published or the
number of subjects tackled, Andrews’s observation is certainly
right. However, scientists still have a limited understanding about
the very nature of cognition and its variation between species.
In fact, our understanding of the cognitive capacities of non-
human and human animals is continuously remodeled by new
experiments. Moreover, in a number of papers many species are
tested for the presence/absence of cognitive abilities. Such a binary
approach can potentially hide quantitative differences between
species (Wright, 2010). But maybe the biggest difficulty is that
a deep understanding of cognition cannot be achieved without
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taking into account the brain mechanisms underlying it. This is
evidently true for detailed analyses at a species level, but it also
holds for comparative studies.
For example, Deaner et al. (2006) found that various cogni-
tive measures have strong positive inter-correlations in primates,
thereby supporting the hypothesis that “primate taxa differ in
some kind of domain-general ability” (see also Reader et al.,
2011). However, the presence of such a “general intelligence” fac-
tor in primates could be the consequence of the concerted scaling
of the brain architecture supporting primates’ cognitive abilities
(see section Factors Underlying the Evolution of the Size and
the Composition of Brains), instead of being an inherent prop-
erty of cognition. Similarly, Lefebvre and Bolhuis (2003) noted
that, in birds, “the negative correlation [between innovation rate
and food storing] is consistent with the idea that there has been
a trade-off between the demands of storing and innovation”
(brackets added), supporting the view of “limited modularity in
animal cognition.” However, roughly speaking, if food storing
depends closely on the hippocampus and learning and innovation
on other nuclei, then the limited modularity of cognitive capaci-
ties directly reflects the architecture of the brain (suggesting that
different cognitive strategies have been selected). If follows from
these two points that understanding the modularity of cognition
requires the study of the neurological bases of cognitive abili-
ties. For example, while chimpanzee and bonobo Pan paniscus are
phylogenetically very close (Fischer et al., 2011), the significant
differences in their behavior (Doran et al., 2002; Hare, 2009) and
cognitive abilities (Herrmann et al., 2010) correlate with slight
differences in their brain architecture (Rilling et al., 2012, see also
Hopkins et al., 2009).
FROM COGNITION TO BEHAVIOR: THE ROLE OF “MENTALITY”
There are species-specific ways to react to a noise, a conspecific,
another species, etc., that go beyond species respective cognitive
capacities and that determine, alongside the perceptual abilities
proper to each species, what kind of information, through all
the information available in the environment, is analysed, and
how. Although much less studied than species differences in cog-
nitive capacities, the terms “temperament” (Réale et al., 2007)
and “behavioral syndrome” (Sih et al., 2004) have sometimes
been proposed to account for this aspect of animal behavior at
the individual, population, species, and even group of species
levels. This lack of specificity is potentially problematic in a neu-
roecological approach, since the neurological bases underlying
behavioral differences at the species and individual levels possibly
differ. For this reason, the term “mentality” has been used here
to describe the species-specific way to analyse and react to their
environment.
The concept of mentality as defined here encompasses the
array of behavioral differences that are not directly due to species
differences in cognitive abilities; such as patience (Stevens et al.,
2005; Rosati et al., 2007; Addessi et al., 2011; Pelé et al., 2011)
and inhibitory control (Amici et al., 2008), differences in risk
preference (Heilbronner et al., 2008), neophilia and exploration
(Parker, 1974; Mettke-Hofmann et al., 2002, 2005; Bergman and
Kitchen, 2009) among others. Such differences between species
could result from large or small changes in the pattern of
brain structure (e.g., Rilling et al., 2012) or neuropeptides (e.g.,
Young, 1999; Lim et al., 2004; Goodson and Kingsbury, 2011)
for example, controlling how species collect and process infor-
mation about their environment (see also Lotem and Halpern,
2012). Because of the homogeneity of brains inside a taxon-
cerebrotype, species generally act in a closer way than compared
to species from other taxon-cerebrotypes. Although this issue
has still to be studied thoroughly (see for example Auersperg
et al., 2012), mentality differences between species could have
profound effects on species apparent cognitive abilities (e.g.,
Greenberg and Mettke-Hofmann, 2001; Greenberg, 2003; Hare,
2009; Byrne and Bates, 2010). Indeed, (Amici et al., 2012) found
that in seven primate species, performances in several cogni-
tive tasks correlate with certain properties of their social system
for which mentality plays an important role. Mapping species
differences in mentality along with differences in cognitive abil-
ities is therefore necessary to understand species differences in
behavior.
INTRA-SPECIFIC ANALYSES
BRAIN/BODY AND BRAIN STRUCTURES SCALING
Some individual minks Mustela vison, have brains up to 40%
larger than others [mean brain around 9 g, data from Kruska
(1996)]. Likewise, differences between the smallest and largest
brains reaches 800 g in humans (mean brain around 1300 g,
Holloway, 1980) and more than 2000 g in elephants Loxodonta
africana (mean brain size roughly equal to 5000 g, Shoshani
et al., 2006). Because large individuals need larger organs, mus-
cles or bones, it could be expected that a part of the variance
in brain size is explained by body size. In minks for exam-
ple, there is a strong correlation between individual brain and
body sizes [cor = 0.97, data from Kruska (1996) range body
weight: 510–1272 g]. However, in other species such as pri-
mates species (see Figure 8, see also Heymsfield et al., 2012) and
at least some bird species (e.g., Møller, 2010) the relationship
between brain and body mass is weak or absent. In fact, how
body size influences brain size inside a species is unknown and
has still to be examined with a large and systematic compara-
tive dataset (see also Holloway, 1980). Species with important
sexual dimorphism, such as pinnipeds (Bininda-Emonds, 2000;
Fitzpatrick et al., 2012) would be particularly interesting (see also
Falk et al., 1999). Also, the process of domestication (Belyaev,
1979; Price, 1999; Trut et al., 2009) is of particular interest here,
because of the variability between brain and body size among
different breeds [review by Kruska (2005)]. Such studies could
ultimately clarify the degree to which body size variations influ-
ence brain size (for example via constraints on skull size, e.g.,
Morriss-Kay and Wilkie, 2005). There has been intense debate
concerning whether body size should be accounted for when
considering brain size differences between human groups (Peters
et al., 1998) or during evolutionary history of the human species
(e.g., Pilbeam andGould, 1974). Ultimately, such issues should be
studied by analysing inter-individual variation in brain structure
sizes.
Finlay et al. (2011) have studied the inter-individual vari-
ations of brain structure sizes in minks, pigs, and laboratory
mice, and concluded that “the pattern of individual variation in
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FIGURE 8 | Brain and body mass (grams) in pygmy marmoset (Cebuella pygmaea) two species of tamarin (Saguinus nigricollis and Saguinus
oedipus) and in squirrel monkeys (Saimiri sciureus), data from Hartwig et al. (2011). Females, red; males, blue; unknown sex, green.
brain component structure [. . . ] is very similar to variation across
species in the same components, at a reduced scale.” Although
the inclusion of domestic individuals is potentially problematic
(see below), this hypothesis is apparently supported by a study
using brain data from 90 young adult humans (Charvet et al.,
2013) which suggests that the same (developmental) mecha-
nisms could be responsible for both within and between species
variations in brain anatomy. As stated in sections Comparative
Brain Studies in Birds and Mammals and Comparing Taxon
and Species Cerebrotypes, the patterns of brain variation at
the mammal level to which these studies refer to are relatively
uninformative (see also Willemet, 2012). Since the range of
variation between human brains is larger than the range of vari-
ation in all the simian species altogether, such a large dataset
is particularly interesting for understanding the intra-species
variation of brain composition. Indeed, a principal component
analysis on brain structure proportion shows that the pattern
of variation of human brain composition seems in continu-
ity with the pattern of variation of simian brain composition
(Figure 9A).
The resemblance could be superficial, however. In particular, a
large part of this result (and of those of Charvet et al., 2013) could
be due to the phenomenon described in section Relative Brain
Size; large size differences between human brains are likely to be
due to differences in the biggest structures: the neocortex and to a
lesser degree, the cerebellum; thereby resembling species variation
across species. Indeed, repeating the analysis on simulated brains
shows a similar pattern (Figure 9B). Furthermore, the hyperscal-
ing found for primate frontal cortex (Bush and Allman, 2004)
is not found in the human sample. In fact, it seems that there
is no predictable variation of cortical composition in human
(Figure 10).
These results suggest that the mechanisms underlying inter-
individual variations in brain structure sizes might be dif-
ferent from those having been selected at the species level.
Understanding the genetic basis of some particular brain con-
formation and in particular in humans, in microcephaly (e.g.,
Mahmood et al., 2011) and rare developmental disease (e.g.,
Manzini and Walsh, 2011; Netchine et al., 2011), could proba-
bly shed light on some of the mechanisms controlling brain size
and composition inside a species (and to some extent between
species, e.g., Gilbert et al., 2005; Molnár et al., 2006). Also inter-
esting are the seasonal variations of brain structure sizes in
some birds and mammals (Yaskin, 1994; Jacobs, 1996; Tramontin
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FIGURE 9 | (A) Brain size as a function of the species position on the first
component of a principal component analysis of simians’ brain structure
proportions (the structures included are medulla, cerebellum,
mesencephalon, diencephalon, striatum, septum, olfactory cortex,
hippocampus, subicular cortex, neocortex). The position of the human
individuals (gray) has been predicted by the PCA done with simian species
(human species excluded). (B) Density plot based on the position on the
precedent first component of 5000 simulated brains constructed by taking
5000 random values for every structure with a normal distribution and a
mean and standard deviation similar to the real dataset. The dashed line
indicates the regression slope for simian brain size as a function of species
position on the principal component analysis.
FIGURE 10 | Principal component analyses of cortex subparts in
humans using absolute sizes (A) and structure proportions (B). Data
come from Allen et al. (2002) and consist in the volumes of 12 cortical
regions (frontal, temporal, parietal, occipital, cingulate, insula on both
hemispheres). Females, dark gray; males, light gray. (A) Correlation
between neocortex size and position on PC1: cor = −0.99, t = −42.3528,
df = 44, p-value < 2.2e-16; (B) Correlation between neocortex size and
position on PC1: cor = −0.02, t = −0.165, df = 44, p-value = 0.8697. The
arrows represent the structure loadings on the two firsts principal
components.
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and Brenowitz, 2000; Sherry and Hoshooley, 2010). Evo-devo
researchers have already described some of the mechanisms that
have been selected during brain evolution [review in Charvet
and Striedter (2011), see also Lipp and Wolfer (2002) and Katz
(2011) for discussion on the evolution of complex nervous sys-
tem]. Accordingly, it has been shown that the size of brain
structures is heritable (Airey et al., 2000; Thompson et al., 2002;
Fears et al., 2009) and controlled by independent loci (Hager
et al., 2012). In controlled conditions, selection for a particu-
lar behavior (high voluntary wheel running) has been associated
with larger midbrains in domestic mice (Kolb et al., 2013).
Interestingly, sex-differences in brain architecture in primate
species suggest that female and male brains could be under dif-
ferent sets of selection pressures (Lindenfors et al., 2007; Smaers
et al., 2012b). For this reason, sex should be accounted for in
studies on the selection pressures underlying the evolution of the
brain.
Domestication represents a particularly valuable resource for
understanding how brain structures can be selected at the species
level (see Kruska, 2005 for a review and Gleich et al., 2000 and
Rehkämper et al., 2003, 2008 for recent contributions). What
emerged from this body of work are profound differences in brain
composition between domesticated and wild forms [review in
Kruska (1988, 2005, 2007)]. However, the number of individ-
uals per species and per condition (wild vs. domestic) is often
very small (typically less than 4–6). Moreover, the method used
in most studies [detailed in Ebinger (1974)] confounds the effect
of brain reduction (or body size augmentation) as well as abso-
lute and relative changes in structure volume. This makes the
results difficult to interpret. For example, while mean neocortex
size is larger in ranch individuals than in wild minks (4802 vs.
4622mm3), this method gives a 17.8% reduction of neocor-
tex size from wild to ranch minks (Kruska, 1996). In spite of
this, reiterating the analyses with a different method supports
one of the original conclusions that in most species, the neo-
cortex is the structure most affected by domestication (Finlay
et al., 2011). Although the reasons for such changes are unknown,
this suggests that some functions supported by the neocortex
may have become unnecessary during domestication, or that
some mechanisms permitting a decrease in brain structure size
while preserving (at least some of) the functions have come
along with domestication. In fact, is is possible that most of the
neurological differences between domestic and wild individuals
are to be found in factors other than size (e.g., Saetre et al.,
2004).
INTER-INDIVIDUAL DIFFERENCES IN COGNITION
In humans, where most studies have been conducted, both the
genetic bases (Frank and Fossella, 2011; Green et al., 2012 but
see Deary et al., 2009; Chabris et al., 2012) and neuroanatom-
ical correlates of individual differences in cognitive abilities are
still unclear. A significant amount of evidence suggests that in
humans, the scores obtained in different cognitive tests correlate
with each other, so that a global factor, called “g” for general intel-
ligence, accounts for an important part of total variance (at least
40 percent, Deary et al., 2010). This suggests that cognitive abil-
ities are not totally independent of each other, sharing (at least
partly) a common mechanism (e.g., Ebisch et al., 2012 but see
also Rabaglia et al., 2011). In fact, more and more evidence indi-
cates that general cognitive abilities originate from a network of
interconnected cortical areas (Deary et al., 2010). Indeed, it seems
that intelligence correlates with brain size in humans (correla-
tion around 0.3 McDaniel, 2005, but see Schoenemann et al.,
2000). Absolute features such as the degree of girification (e.g.,
Germanaud et al., 2012) or neuron number (at least in the neo-
cortex; Pakkenberg and Gundersen, 1997) could probably explain
a part of this relationship. However, whether inter-individual
variations in structure size and neuron number always corre-
late has still to be studied thoroughly (in the number of species,
individual per species, and structures). For example, in 9 owl
monkeys individuals Aotus trivirgatus, Collins et al. (2013) have
found no significant correlation between the masses of several
visual brain structures and neuron number. Inter-individual dif-
ferences in cognitive abilities go beyond such a general factor.
Indeed, human studies have shown that for every cognitive test,
part of the unexplained variance “reflects the particular abilities
involved in the test” (Deary et al., 2010). More exactly, particular
cognitive abilities seem to be supported by localized brain areas
(e.g., Johnson et al., 2008, see also Gläscher et al., 2010). While
the understanding of the neurological bases of individual differ-
ences in cognitive abilities is still in its infancy, it is complicated by
the role of environment in both brain composition and cognitive
abilities (Mohammed et al., 2002; Simpson and Kelly, 2011), and
by individual differences in perceptual abilities (Kanai and Rees,
2011).
The considerable work in humans contrasts with the small
literature on this subject in other species, where individual differ-
ences in cognitive abilities have often been considered as variation
around a mean (Thornton and Lukas, 2012). Yet, a similar “g
factor” has been found in the other species investigated [review
by Chabris (2007), see also Banerjee et al. (2009) on cotton-top
tamarin Saguinus Oedipus and Matzel et al. (2011) on mice, but
see Vonk and Povinelli (2011) and Herrmann and Call (2012) for
mixed results in chimpanzees and apes, respectively]. In addition,
it has been proposed that cognitive capacities correlate with brain
size in rats (Anderson, 1993). In fact, although there is a growing
body of research on the evolutionary significance of individual
variation in cognitive abilities (Boogert et al., 2011; Cole et al.,
2012; Thornton and Lukas, 2012; Cauchard et al., 2013), individ-
ual differences in cognitive abilities have still to be systematically
investigated in non-human animals.
Interestingly, themechanisms underlying species differences in
cognitive abilities probably differ from those between individuals
of a species. Firstly, as described above, variations of processing
capacities inside a taxon cerebrotype is probably due to the cumu-
lative effect of brain structure scaling and absolute features that go
along with larger brains. Between individuals of a species, how-
ever, such kind of brain structure scaling is apparently limited
(for example in the absence of hyperscaling of frontal cortex, see
above). Secondly, while brain size correlates both with reaction
time and general intelligence in human [see review by Chabris
(2007)] macaque monkeys are faster than humans on certain
visual tasks, for a degree of accuracy quite similar (Vauclair et al.,
1993; Fabre-Thorpe et al., 1998; Delorme et al., 2000; Fize et al.,
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2011). If such a trend was confirmed with a systematic analysis
(see also Washburn and Rumbaugh, 1997), this would suggest
that brain size variations have different meanings given the level
of variation; individuals or species. Therefore, hypotheses on the
factors underlying inter and intra-species differences in cogni-
tive abilities should be carefully examined before, maybe, being
transferred between these two levels.
INTER-INDIVIDUAL DIFFERENCES IN PERSONALITY
The concept of “personality” describes the behavioral differences
between individuals of a species that go beyond their respective
differences in cognitive abilities (see Gosling, 2001, and Uher,
2011 for a review of the term used). Individual differences in “per-
sonality” can now be identified in “in a broad array of species,
ranging from squid, crickets, and lizards, to trout, geese, and
orangutans” (Gosling, 2008; see also Weiss et al., 2012). It is
likely, however, that the neuronal mechanisms underlying indi-
vidual characteristics among guppies differ from those between
rats for example. Indeed, and although the differences between
the two may have been overstated (Shiner and DeYoung, 2013),
the traditional distinction between temperament and person-
ality (where, schematically, temperament describes biologically
anchored behavioral traits while personality includes the effects of
individual construction through personal history) used in human
research could be of interest here (see also Stamps and Groothuis,
2010).
Insight will come by studying the mechanisms underly-
ing inter-individual differences in personality (Robinson, 2001;
Buckholtz et al., 2007; Blatchley and Hopkins, 2010; Adelstein
et al., 2011) and their genetic bases (Plomin, 1990; Fidler et al.,
2007; Adams, 2011). The fact that personality traits can be linked
with differences in brain anatomy (e.g., DeYoung et al., 2010)
poses the question of whether personality affects brain compo-
sition, or whether brain composition affects personality. It is
likely, in fact, that these two levels interact. Domestication could
be particularly interesting here (Trut, 1999; Agnvall et al., 2012;
Kukekova et al., 2012). As more species are studied, inter-species
differences in personality structures (that is, the dimensions par-
ticular to each species onto which individual differences take
place, Uher and Asendorpf, 2008) will be mapped. This is impor-
tant since personality traits affect individual life-history traits
(Biro and Stamps, 2008), therefore having an important role in
the fitness of an individual (Dingemanse et al., 2004; Smith and
Blumstein, 2008; Réale et al., 2007, 2010; Wolf et al., 2007; Schuett
et al., 2010; Wolf and Weissing, 2010). In the same way that cog-
nitive abilities cannot be studied between species without the
mentality concept described earlier, inter individual differences in
cognitive abilities and personality must be studied conjointly for
understanding individual differences in behavior (Locurto, 2007;
Carere and Locurto, 2011; Sih and Del Giudice, 2012). Both levels
have been central in species evolution.
CONCLUDING REMARKS
Beside all the methodological and conceptual problems reported
here, a significant bias in evolutionary neuroscience is the par-
ticular place given to human brain and cognition. As stated by
Deacon; “we are, after all, the ‘sapient’ ape, distinguished from
all other species by our unusual mental powers. But this has also
motivated themany preconceptions that we bring to the topic that
affect both the selection of scientific evidence and our interpreta-
tions of it. The single most pervasive issue behind most of these
preconceptions is the notion of human intellectual superiority”
(Deacon, 1990a, original quotation marks). Under this view, it
is the fact that the human brain is not at the top of a criterion
that makes this criterion inadequate for determining intelligence,
and conversely. The misconceptions that this approach has lead,
even at the brain size level (see above), have a heuristic value
and warn against considering this approach for more complex
variables. This comment echoes Chittka et al. (2012) who, refer-
ring to an analysis that found human species to be the slowest
in a color learning task, warned that although “there may be
good reasons not to equate learning speed with intelligence [. . . ]
the fact that humans do not top the chart should not be one
of them.”
The importance of such fallacies can be broadened to the
mammalian brain in general. For instance, spontaneous mir-
ror self-recognition occurs with the 350 g chimpanzee’s brain
(Gallup, 1970), the 2000 g dolphin brain Tursiops truncatus (Reiss
and Marino, 2001) and the 4000 g elephant brain Elephas max-
imus (Plotnik et al., 2006) but also with the small 5 g magpie
brain Pica pica (Prior et al., 2008). More generally, the complex
cognitive abilities of several bird species (Emery and Clayton,
2004; Emery, 2006; Kirsch et al., 2008), suggest that the brain
architecture of birds is particularly efficient. This is interesting,
given the relatively recent misconception that bird intelligence
was limited and their behaviors only stereotyped (Emery, 2006)
and the still widely accepted postulate that the mammalian brain
is the most complex and efficient structure in term of cognitive
abilities. In fact, the highest ratio of cognitive abilities to neuron
number could possibly be found in non-vertebrate taxa such as
cephalopods (e.g., Hochner et al., 2006; Grasso and Basil, 2009;
Ikeda, 2009) and insects (e.g., Menzel and Giurfa, 2001; Chittka
and Skorupski, 2011).
Finally, it is particularly striking to note [as Griffin (1976)
did more than twenty-five years ago] that the subjective part of
behavior, that is, the way animals experience the world, has been
systematically put aside in comparative studies of animal behav-
ior. As stated by Shettleworth (2001): “it is possible, indeed usual,
to study the ways in which animals acquire information about the
world through their senses, process, retain and respond to it with-
out making any commitment about the nature of their subjective
experience or awareness.” Yet, what makes a bird or mammal flee
danger is fear or pain, to search for food is hunger, what makes it
look for mates is sexual arousal and for a place to sleep is fatigue,
so that the subjective dimension of animal mind; consciousness,
is the fundamental link between brain, cognition, and behavior.
Studying animal brain and behavior without raising the question
of how animals experience the world is likely to be as incomplete
as was studying biology without evolution. In fact, this is one of
evolutionary neuroscience’s principal challenges.
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